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Abstract: By introducing taste heterogeneity between mobile workers in a New Economic 
Geography (NEG) model where the housing price is the main driving force behind dispersion of 
workers we show that residential segregation and agglomeration are not the sole stable equilibria 
and that dispersion also emerges with trade liberalization. In addition we find that contrary to the 
Tiebout hypothesis where segregation is efficient, here it is the dispersed and mixed equilibrium 
which can be improving for all. 
JEL Classifications: F12, R12 
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1. Introduction 
Needless to say, urban segregation is an important issue. Economic costs of gated 
communities on one side and of poor districts on the other are high. Among direct costs, the fact 
that productive forces remain inactive on account of a bad zip code is certainly not tolerable. 
Among indirect costs, the underground economy which is often fueled by spatial and social 
exclusion represents a significant waste of resources that should be avoided. Then it urges us to 
understand the determinant of spatial segregation. 
There are at least three theories which aim to comprehend segregation. The first one 
focuses on land rent: the price of land is higher around places where services and jobs are 
concentrated owing to low commuting costs, then individuals are spread according to their incomes, 
the rich are located near attractive places while the poor are compelled to live far away. In other 
words, the land use pattern forms a set of Thünen rings (Fujita [6]). This theory explains one part of 
segregation, for instance in many European countries - from the second world war to the seventies - 
massive constructions were undertaken at the periphery of cities because vast areas were available 
at a low price. A second theory considers that the source of segregation comes from discrimination: 
homogeneous community might either be willing to pay to avoid immigrants which do not share 
their characteristics - this phenomenon is known as decentralized discrimination - or may be able to 
restrict immigrants' location choices; in that case sociologists speak about centralized 
discrimination. The latter kind of discrimination was particularly common in the US at the 
beginning of the twentieth century; in Chicago for instance, the Hyde Park Improvement Protective 
Club produced different listings of housings for sale according to racial factors. Nowadays and 
since the sixties, a symptom of decentralized discrimination has been revealed by the "white flight" 
that takes place when the concentration of black families reaches a certain threshold (the famous 
tipping point of Schelling [11]). Lastly a third theory asserts that a part of the segregation comes 
from preference heterogeneity. Taste heterogeneity may concern the consumption of public goods 
and/or the consumption of private goods. In the case where individuals do not share identical tastes 
concerning public goods, those who value these goods will concentrate in locations where public 
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services are abundant, while those with a lower demand will choose locations with a lower level of 
public services and taxes. To sum up, individuals reveal their preferences by "voting with their feet" 
(Tiebout [12]). In such a framework, competition among jurisdictions results in homogeneous 
clubs, no individual will be better off moving, and then segregation is efficient. Obviously, as has 
been shown empirically by Rhode and Strumpf [10], non-Tiebout motives also matter, individuals 
can choose segregation deliberately because it is a way to get a job thanks to the community 
networks or to consume typical goods which are less available in other communities. The usual 
example to illustrate this kind of segregation concerns the Chinese community (Chinatowns in 
USA), but many others examples exist, for instance in Canada a Francophile resident may prefer 
Montreal to Toronto because a wide variety of goods that suit his/her tastes are available there 
(Glazer et al. [7]). In a recent work, Zeng [13] gives the first theoretical formalization of this kind of 
segregation. By using an NEG standard model (the Footloose Entrepreneurs model), the author 
finds an important result: full dispersion, in which two types of mobile workers and two industries 
equally disperse in two regions, is not a stable equilibrium. In other words, only ghettos can exist 
and a situation where people are melt throughout territory is not possible. 
In the present work we propose to challenge this point of view by again raising the question 
of the existence of a dispersed equilibrium and by questioning the desirability of segregation in a 
modified version of the Zeng model. Intuitively in the Zeng model a new immigrant increases 
demand on the goods market and thus encourages firms to move, but if a firm follows mobile 
workers, then firms' competition leads to a reduction in the local price index, which encourages 
immigration but deters delocation. Then even in the case where firms are dispersed, consumers are 
not and segregation emerges as the sole stable equilibrium. But Zeng puts aside the land market 
although the availability of land is often a major element that impacts on segregation. Then in the 
present model, by introducing an immobile housing stock, we find that segregation, i.e. 
agglomeration of each type of workers in a different location pushes up housing prices and then 
makes the dispersive equilibrium stable. Although this centrifugal force has been studied before,
1
 its 
introduction in a framework with heterogeneous preferences provides new insights. In particular, as 
simple as this model may be, it provides interesting equilibrium outcomes: for intermediate level of 
trade freeness agglomeration and segregation are stable while for lower and for higher trade costs 
the stable multiple equilibria are dispersion and segregation. This result once again reveals the 
importance of History, but also indicates that the trend of segregation which has increased rapidly in 
the latest decades can be broken by an exogenous shock or by public policies. Significantly while 
Zeng finds that segregation is the best outcome for all immigrants, we find that the equilibrium 
where workers are dispersed and mingled can be Pareto dominant. 
All these results are presented in four stages: in Section 2 the formal model is developed, 
Section 3 is devoted to the equilibrium analysis, Section 4 investigates welfare and lastly Section 5 
concludes. 
2. The model 
The economic space is made of two regions, 1 and 2. The economy has four sectors, two 
modern sectors (X, Y), a traditional sector (T) and a housing sector (H). The two modern sectors 
produce a continuum of varieties of a horizontally differentiated product under increasing returns. 
Each variety is produced by a single firm, using both skilled and unskilled labor. The T-sector 
produces homogeneous good - which are trade costless - under constant returns, exclusively using 
unskilled workers, which are equally spread in the two regions. 
                                                 
1
 See Candau [1] for a survey. 
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Each household's preferences take the Dixit [4] form introduced by Pflüger [7] in the NEG 
literature. We extend this framework to the case of two kinds of skilled workers and two industries 
(à la Zeng [13]) and we follow Pflüger and Suedekum [4] by including the housing consumption: 
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Where kiX  and 
k
iY  are two kinds of manufactured goods consumed by a representative 
consumer of type },{ yxk   in a city }2,1{i , kiH  denotes the housing consumption, 
k
iT is the 
homogeneous commodity. The term   represents the preference for housing, while   and   
express the intensity of preferences for the differentiated products with the following assumption 
concerning  : 
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which characterizes the fact that k-type individuals prefer type-k industrial goods to any other type.    
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With  /)1(  and xN  the number of varieties produced by the industry x,    the 
elasticity of substitution between varieties, and kx
i
d  the consumption of a manufactured product x 
by a consumer of type },{ yxk  . 
We denote xhs  the population share of entrepreneurs x in region 1, then with h the total 
population of each entrepreneur's type and with kjn  the set of all varieties in industry  },{ yxk    
produced in region }2,1{j  we have: 
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The demand for housing is given by Hii pH /  then the aggregate housing demand in 
region 1 is  HL
hh
phssH yx 121 /))((  . Obviously at the equilibrium aggregate demand equals 
aggregate supply, which is fixed and given by H in either region. Hence the housing price is 
calculated in region 1 as follows: 
HhLssp yx hh
H
i /)2/)((   
According to this equation, housing price increases with the number of inhabitants. 
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Concerning the cost function in the industrial sector, we consider with Forslid and 
Ottaviano
[5]
 that the fixed cost and the marginal cost are associated with different factors: the fixed 
cost involves f units of entrepreneurs while the variable cost requires v units of unskilled workers. 
Furthermore, because skilled workers are totally mobile from one sector to the next, and have the 
same skills (there is no productivity difference between x and y) there is equalization of wages. 
Thus the total cost of producing q(s) units of a typical manufactured variety is: 
)(sqvwfwTC Tii   
Where Tw represents the wage of unskilled workers. Each firm is a monopolist on the 
production of its variety, then when a typical type-k firm in city 1 maximizes its profit under the 
Dixit-Stiglitz assumptions, it sets the following price on its local market: 
).1/()(  Tii vwsp  
Because there is free entry, profits are always equal to zero, which gives the level of output 
./)1()( Tii vwfwsq    
Moreover industrial varieties are exchanged between regions under trade costs which take 
the form of iceberg costs: if an industrial variety produced in market i is sold at price iip  there, then 
the delivered price (c.i.f) of that variety in market j is going to be )(spij  with 1 . Then we obtain 
a change in price indices: 
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By considering the numerator of this demand 1x , we can observe that from the dispersed 
equilibrium an increase in the number of entrepreneurs in region 1, increases expenditure there and 
lowers it abroad, which, ceteris paribus and as long as there are impediments to trade, increases 
demand in region 1 (market access effect). Concerning the denominator an increase in the number 
of firms in region 1 fosters a decrease in the demand addressed to a typical firm in this region (local 
competition effect). 
3. Equilibrium Analysis 
In the long run migration stops when real wages are equalized in case of symmetry, or 
when agglomeration in one city generates a higher relative real wage. More precisely it is assumed 
that migration is regulated by a simple Marshallian adjustment
2
: 
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Where x  and y  are the adjustment speeds and 
kh
iV  the indirect utility of a type-k 
entrepreneur in region i, defined by: 
                                                 
2
This is an usual assumption in the literature. 
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Notice that in the long run two additional forces appear: on the one hand the term Hipln  
introduces a dispersive force, namely the land market crowding effect, which implies that an 
increase in the number of skilled workers in one city impacts negatively on the cost of living there.        
On the other hand the term yi
x
i PP ln)1(ln    indicates that goods are cheaper in a central 
place because imports are lower and thus the burden of transaction costs too. Then agglomeration 
also has a positive effect on the cost of living. 
With this model in hand we want to know which of the following equilibria exist and are 
stable: 
1) Full segregation of migrants (type-x individuals in one region and type-y individuals in 
the other). 
2) Total agglomeration (each type agglomerated in one location). 
3) Full dispersion (50% of individuals x and y in region 1). 
In the following we analyze these three different cases successively
3
. 
3.1  Full segregation 
Full segregation is assumed in this subsection. We consider that individuals x are all 
agglomerated in region 1, while type-y individuals are agglomerated in region 2. Then we set 
1hxs , 0hys , which gives 
xxyxy nhnhn 111 )(   , 
xxxyxxy NhnNhnn  112 )2(  , 
and  xxx nNn 12  . Next, by equalizing the demand to the supply, we obtain the following system: 
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Which allows us to obtain the expression of ,1w  
xn1 , and 
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Then an increase in the heterogeneity of preferences  , induces an increase in the process 
of specialization (or in other words in the agglomeration of industries). 
Therefore, it is important to notice that in this model full segregation of workers is not 
equivalent to full specialization; indeed because all individuals consume all goods (x and y) the 
geographical separation of individuals does not necessarily imply a full separation of industries.   
Two industries are partially dispersed if [,2/]1 HHn
x  , which according to the above expression of 
xn1  is equivalent to: 
    hLLhFS 2/)1(2   
This partial separation is stable if there is no incentive to migrate, i.e if  
xhxh VV 21   , which is 
verified here: 
    01/ln)21(
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2
21  
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
hLh
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3
As in Zeng ([4], Appendix B) the case of partial segregation (for instance individuals of type-x in one 
region and individuals of type-y dispersed in the two regions) is not stable. 
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Equivalently it is found that 021 
yhyh VV , then whatever the type of individuals, 
segregating workers is a stable equilibrium
4
. 
We can now analyze the equilibrium with a full separation of industries. In notation, 1x , 
0y , and HNNnn yxyx  21  hold, which gives the following nominal wages: 
 hLhww /)(21   
This full segregation is stable if mobile workers of type-x located in region 1 earn a higher 
real wage in this location, i.e if 
xhxh VV 21   is verified, which is always true, indeed we find that: 
)1/()ln)21((21  
xhxh VV  
which is positive because by definition we have 0ln   (because 1 ) and 0)21(   .   
Symmetrically we find that 
yhyh VV 21   always holds. 
We can now turn toward firms' behavior in order to determine if they can make positive 
profit by shifting their production from region 1 to region 2. Profit in region 2 is given by: 
  ,2/)1)1((2)1()1()]1/([ 22  hhLwx   
this expression is negative, and then separation is stable if: 
)2/())1(2(  hLLhFS   
Then the following result concludes our analysis by: 
Proposition 1: A separation of workers and a partial dispersion of firms is stable if trade 
liberalization is below a critical value FS , while a full separation is stable above this threshold. 
Such a result is very close to the proposition 2 presented by Zeng [13]. Furthermore we can 
notice that full separation emerges sooner (in terms of trade freeness) for high preference 
heterogeneity. A corollary of this is that for homogeneous preference the full separation of 
industries never happens (indeed full separation occurs if 1/)2(  LLh , which is impossible by 
definition). 
We can now investigate the agglomerated equilibrium which turns out to be more complex. 
3.2  Total agglomeration in one region 
Let's assume that all the activities are agglomerated in region 1, in that case we set
1 yx  , and  NNNnn yxyx  21  and we find the following nominal wages: 
 /)2(1 Lhw   
  )12(/)( 22  hLhLw   
Full agglomeration is stable if 021 
xx hh VV  which is verified when: 
0)1)(12/(  hN  
with     )12()))42(1()21()(1((/)2(ln)1(21 2  hhLhhLLhN   . 
Even if it is not possible to find the range of trade liberalization for which the full 
agglomeration is stable, we can present the following result: 
                                                 
4
We have also checked that no firms find an interest in moving when )2/()22(  hLhLh  , 
which is verified by: 
0/   ,0/   ,0/   ,0/ 22121111 
yxyx nynxnynx  
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Proposition 2: Full agglomeration is a stable equilibrium for intermediate value of trade freeness. 
Proof: Figure 1 helps to understand this proof, the vertical axis represents the differential real 
wages while the horizontal axis displays the level of trade freeness
5
. Then it is clear in this 
simulation that the welfare gap between region 1 and 2 is bell-shaped with respect to   and 
positive for intermediate values of trade freeness. In order to prove this result we need to 
verify that the term 
xhxh VV 21   is 1) negative around extreme values of  , 2) increasing 
around 0  and increasing around 1 ,  3) admits only one maximum. Firstly we can 
show that 0| 021  
xhxh VV  because 0)1(lim 0   LN  and

  0)1)(12(lim 0  h , 
then  ][lim 210
xhxh VV . Concerning the derivative we get: 
])1)(12/[()1)(1()2((/)( 2221   hLhhhVV
xx hh  
and then we find that the limit of the numerator when   tends to zero is positive (equals to  
)1( L ) while the denominator tends to 0 then  0| 0
)(
21 


xhxh VV  . Around 1  and by normalizing 
the total population h to one (without loss of generality), we find that 0)/)2ln((21  LLVV
xhxh   
and 0])1/[()21(|/)( 121    
xhxh VV . Lastly the real wage gap admits only one 
maximum between 0 and 1 given by )1)(1(2/])1)(1(4[ 22max   LLL . QED 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Figure 1. Welfare gap 
These intermediate values for which agglomeration is sustainable are noted sl  and 
s
h  (in 
Figure 1 we get approximately 28.0
s
l  and 78.0
s
h ). 
3.3  Full dispersion 
Full dispersion is characterized with  
xxx nNn 12  , 
xyxy nhn 11 )(   , 
xyxxy Nhnn  )2(12   
This allows us to obtain at the symmetric equilibrium the expression of ,1w  
xn1  and 
xN : 
 hLhww /)(21   
2/2/]2[ 111 hwhwLhn
x    
hN x   
which permits to deduce the following proposition: 
 
                                                 
5
Parameters: ,6.0  ,5  ,1 hL  .05.0  
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Proposition 3: A stable interior equilibrium, in which two types of mobile workers disperse, exists 
for an intermediate level of trade liberalization. 
Proof: see appendix A. QED. 
This result contrasts with Zeng [13] who proves the absence of this equilibrium. 
3.4  Evolving path 
To summarize the previous findings, Figure 2.a and 2.b illustrate the distribution of firms 
and mobile workers as a function of trade freeness. In order to describe these Figures, it is important 
to recall that four effects determine location choices: the ‘market-access effect’, the ‘cost-of-living 
effect’, the ‘local competition effect’, and the ‘land market crowding effect’. While the market 
access effect entails a growth in nominal wages when workers move to the North, the cost-of-living 
effect results in a price reduction which fosters workers' agglomeration and deters that of firms. 
Limiting the effects of these agglomeration forces on the workers' location choice, the competition 
effect and the land market crowding effect, play an opposite role and represent the two dispersion 
forces of the model. 
Around autarky, dispersive forces are dominant for firms which are partially dispersed 
while agglomeration forces lead to a segregation of workers. Trade liberalization in such a case 
leads to a gradual specialization of region 1 and 2 until the threshold FS  where the full separation 
equilibrium emerges. In that case firms and type-x individuals are located in region 1 while firms 
and type-y workers are located in region 2. 
However this partial and total segregation are not the sole stable equilibria: between 
[,]
b
l
d
l   and  [,]
d
h
b
h   dispersion is also a possible equilibrium. Indeed if one worker moves, 
then the price of housing increases and thus the migrant prefers to return home, moreover if one 
firm deviates from this equilibrium, then local competition increases and the price index decreases, 
which reduces operating profit and then allows to stabilize the dispersed equilibrium. 
Lastly between bl  and 
b
h  agglomeration forces are sufficiently strong type x and type y 
individuals and firms are then agglomerated in one of the two regions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Bifurcation diagram 
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Those results predict the important role of path dependence in which even small shocks 
may give rise to large structural changes in the composition of one city. 
A possible direction for future development would be to test empirically whether multiple 
equilibria are ‘theoretical curiosities’ or if an economy in which individuals are segregated can 
become an economy which mingles different people after a significant shock.
 6
 
4. Welfare Analysis 
Until now we have only analyzed entrepreneurs' relative welfare. Here we propose a finer 
analysis by studying the individual welfare of the different interest groups which are given by: 
  Hi
y
i
x
ii
h
i pPPwV
x
lnln)1(ln  
  Hi
x
i
y
ii
h
i pPPwV
y
lnln)1(ln  
  Hi
y
i
x
i
L
i pPPV ln2/)ln(ln1  
The objective is to examine these expressions under the three different equilibria 
(segregation, agglomeration and dispersion) in order to determine the best social outcome. Then we 
start this analysis with entrepreneurs' welfare and we find that: 
 
Proposition 4: If preference heterogeneity is relatively high and if preference for housing is 
sufficiently strong, then dispersion is the best outcome for mobile workers. 
Proof: Under the different equilibrium (with subscript a for agglomeration, s for segregation and d 
for dispersion) the welfare of mobile workers is given by:  
 )1/()]/)2(ln()2)((1()12ln()1[(  HLhLhhV
xh
a  
 )1(/)]2/)1(ln()1)((()2/)2ln(()1([  hhhLhHLhhV
xh
d  
)1/(ln)1()2/)2ln(()1/(ln/)(   hHLhhhLhV
xh
s  
Then the higher the differences between mobile workers, the more likely the dispersed 
equilibrium is going to be preferred in comparison with the segregated equilibrium. Indeed we find 
that: 
)1/()ln))1/(2(ln(  
xx h
d
h
s VV  
         and 0
xx h
d
h
s VV  if )/1ln(/)2/)1ln((   . Concerning the agglomerated equilibrium and 
the dispersed equilibrium we find that  0
xx h
a
h
s VV   for the following critical value 
h   (the 
critical value of   cannot be obtained analytically): 
))]/)2(ln()2/)2(ln(()1(/[)]2/)1(ln()12ln()1(([ HLhHLhhhhhhah    
With )1)(2( 2  hLLhha  
       Then in case of high taste heterogeneity and intense preference for housing we have 
xxx h
a
h
s
h
d VVV  . A similar reasoning can be carries out regarding type-y workers. QED. 
                                                 
6
Exogeneous shocks such as wars or natural catastrophes (hurricane, tsunami etc) are usually used to 
analyse how historical accidents can shape the location of firms (Davis and Weinstein [3]) but to our 
knowledge these kinds of shocks have never been used to analyse the evolution of spatial segregation. 
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This result contrasts with a part of the literature which finds that mobile workers always 
prefer agglomeration to dispersion. It is also a complement of Pflüger and Suedekum [4] who 
demonstrate that dispersion can be preferred to agglomeration where an immobile housing stock is 
introduced, but who do not analyze the segregated equilibrium. 
We can now analyze the situation of immobile workers by making a difference between 
those who are located in the potential Core (region 1) and those who are located in the potential 
Periphery (region 2). We find the following result: 
Proposition 5: If tastes heterogeneity is sufficiently strong and if the preference for housing is 
sufficiently weak, then dispersion is the best outcome for immobile workers. 
Proof:  11 Ls
L
d VV    if  )/1ln(
)2/)1ln((1

  L   and  11 La
L
d VV    if: 
)]/)2(ln()/)2)(ln((1/[()2/)1(ln()12ln()1((1 HLhHLhhh
L    
       Then dispersion is preferred by immobile workers in region 1 when taste heterogeneity is 
sufficiently low and when preference for housing is sufficiently high. With respect to 
immobile workers who live in region 2 we get: 
22 L
s
L
d VV    if  )/1ln(/))1/(2ln(
2   L   and  22 La
L
d VV    if: 
)]/ln()2/)2)(ln((1/[()ln)2/)1(ln()12ln()1((2 HhLHLhhh
L    
       Then dispersion is preferred by immobile workers in region 2 when taste heterogeneity is 
sufficiently strong and when preference for housing is sufficiently weak. QED. 
The latter proposition linked to Proposition 4 raises an important question concerning the 
desirability of the dispersed equilibrium. Then thanks to the critical values of   and   we find the 
following result. 
 
Conjecture 1: Dispersion can be Pareto improving. 
Proof: Firstly Proposition 4 and 5 demonstrate that dispersion is preferred to segregation if  
],[ 12
LL    (note that  hL  1  ). In Figure 3.a we plot 2L  and 1L  with respect to  , 
which allows us to demonstrate that when 12 LL    , then it is possible to find a range of 
taste heterogeneity which verifies that  ],[ 12 LL    (the black area represents this 
situation). Proposition 4 and 5 indicate that dispersion is preferred to agglomeration if 
h  , 2L   and if  1L  . In Figure 3.b
7
 we plot h , 2L  and 1L  with respect to  , 
which allows us to see that we can find a range of housing preferences for which dispersion 
is preferred to agglomeration by everybody (again black area) . QED. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
Parameters used in Figure 3.b are 1 HLh , 501.0 , 5 , 6.0 . Figure 3.a is more general 
because 2L  and 1L  only depends on  . 
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Figure 3. Pareto improvement 
The proof of this result indicates that the Pareto domination of the dispersed equilibrium is 
less likely when trade is liberalized in cases where individuals have very different tastes and a weak 
preference for housing. 
5. Welfare Analysis 
By focusing on taste heterogeneity for private goods in a New Economic Geography model, 
Zeng [13] provided a new framework for the study of spatial segregation. His approach emphasizes 
that 1) increasing returns, trade liberalization and monopolistic competition lead to an endogenous 
persistent residential segregation, 2) dispersion is not a stable equilibrium 3) agglomeration is a 
better outcome than segregation except for unskilled workers in the peripheral region. 
By introducing a housing stock we have checked the robustness of the result (1) but we 
have also found the vulnerability of conclusion (2) and (3) which depends heavily on the dispersive 
forces which are at work. In our model dispersion is a stable equilibrium because on the one hand 
firms' agglomeration exacerbates local competition while on the other hand workers' agglomeration 
increases housing prices. These higher prices in the Core obviously impact on individuals' well-
being, and then we have shown that the dispersed equilibrium can be Pareto improving for that 
reason. 
Obviously the present work is still in the early stages, the urban pattern needs to be 
modeled in greater details, for instance difference in lot size and commuting costs are natural 
parameters to improve the analysis. It may be particularly interesting to analyse how the different 
types of individuals choose their location among cities but also within each city. Lastly another 
important issue is to understand how urban sprawl impacts on spatial segregation. 
Appendix: symmetric and mixed equilibrium 
From the market clearing condition, we find nominal wages: 
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which allows to obtain ,1w  ,2w  
xn1  and 
xN  given in the text, and next by deriving these equations with 
respect to xh
s  we obtain a system of four equations with four unknowns. Then by resolving this system 
at the symmetric equilibrium  5.0 yhxh
ss   we get: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We also calculate the derivatives of ,1w  ,2w  
xn1 , and 
xN  with respect to which at 
the symmetric equilibrium are given by: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lastly concerning the derivatives of price indices we get: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thanks to these equations we determine: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
with  1a , 2)1( b , 1 c , .22 2bbd    Lastly we find that: 
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Then the symmetric equilibrium is stable if 
    
 
 
 
 
and 
 
 
 
The first inequality is verified if [,0[
b
l  and/or if ]1,]
b
h  while the second one is verified 
for [,]
d
h
d
l  , where these critical values are given by: 
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Although these critical values appear to be complicated, they become simpler at  5.0   where 
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h   . This result is interesting because on the one hand 
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h  are independent of 
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inequalities previously presented hold when [,]
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stability of the dispersed equilibrium. 
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Table 1. Critical points of trade opening 
 5.0  6.0  75.0  95.0  
b
l  0.218 0.218 0.218 0.218 
d
l  0.218 0.211 0.176 0.127 
b
h  0.805 0.805 0.805 0.805 
d
h  0.805 0.821 0.905 1.11323 
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